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Comparable worth pay plans have been inplemented in several states since
the early 1980's. We examine the case of comparable worth in Iowa, as
proposed in 1984 and as actually implemented (in compromise form) in 1985 and
as adjusted as a result of the appeals process in 1987, In particular, we
identify the relative winners and losers from comparable worth by analyzing
the impact on earnings for males, females, minorities, unionized ^ployees and
particular occupational groups such as supervisors and professionals. In
addition, we are able to determine whether the relationships between the State
pay structure and variables such as market wages, educational attainment, and
work experience are altered by the plans.
After discussing the development of comparable worth in Iowa in the first
section. Section II details our hypotheses and the issues which motivated this
paper. Section III outlines our methodology and Section IV summarizes our
data. Section V presents our results. We conclude the paper with a summary
of .our results and some observations on comparable worth,
I. History
In 1983, the Iowa State legislature passed a bill stipulating that State
departments, boards, commissions and agencies shall not discriminate in
compensation between predominently male and female jobs of comparable worth.
Toward that end, the State of Iowa engaged Arthur Young and Company to
evaluate the inherent "value" to the State of the more than 800 job
classifications in the Iowa State Merit Employment System, excluding the
University Regents System. Arthur Young was directed to ignore market wages
in conducting its analysis since the market was presumed to reflect
discriminatory practices of employers in the private sector.
The Arthur Young consultants elected to use a point system to establish
the relative value of the jobs in the state system. Each job was assigned a
point total based on information on the job's level of 13 job characteristics
weighted by the importance of the characteristic to the state. The thirteen
factors were: 1) the academic or technical training required to do the job;
2) the minimum time normally required to learn the job; 3) the number of
personal contacts with nonsupervisory personnel; A) the complexity of duties
or requirement for decision-making; 5) extent of supervision required on the
job; 6) physical effort or fatigue; 7) mental and manual coordination; 8)
continuity and pace of work; 9) supervisory responsibility; 10) the
relationship of the work to work done elsewhere within or outside the
organizational unit; 11) the consequences of and potential for making errors;
12) the work environment; and 13) the risks associated with the job. The
first three factors measured skill, the next five measured effort, the next
three measured responsibility and the remaining two measured working
conditions. The unit of measurement for each characteristic was a subjective
scale (for example, one-to-five with one being least risky and five being most
risky). Interestingly, these subjective scales were used even when objective
measures could have been used Ce,g,, years of education, incidence of injury
per man-hour, etc.) presumably because use of such objective measures would
require more cost and time in obtaining the objective measures.
The source of information on job characteristics was a questionnaire
distributed to about twenty-five percent of the employees. The sample was
selected to insure that all job classifications were included. For
classifications with five or fewer incumbents, all incumbents were sampled.
For the other classifications, no fewer than five incumbents were included.
Completed questionnaires were reviewed by the immediate supervisor and by the
consultants for accuracy and completeness. The surveys yielded information on
758 of the 810 job classifications. Of the 52 classifications not studied, 12
were scheduled for deletion and the remaining AO eithef had no current
incumbents or no questionnaires were returned. The State Merit Emplojnnent
Department evaluated the 40 remaining classifications based upon existing job
specifications.
The questionnaires elicited information on the employee's duties,
responsibilities, e:q}erience requirements and working conditions. Because
earlier job evaluations may have undervalued the characteristics
of female-dominated jobs, this questionnaire was specifically designed to
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identify aspects of jobs that were traditionally held by women. These
questionnaires were then distributed to "job evaluation teams" to be used in
determining the factor points.
The nine job evaluation teams were composed of four merit employees, one
personnel specialist, one technical/professional, one supervisory/managerial
employee and one member of the support staff. Each team had two men and two
women with efforts to balance the groups by age and location. These
individuals were given 21 hours of training to perform their tasks. They then
evaluated the 758 job classifications. The consultants assisted the teams and
attempted to insure that each team was using the evaluation system in a
consistent manner. The result was a set of measures of each of the thirteen
job characteristics for each job.
Next, the consultants needed to establish weights for the different job
factors. Arthur Young proposed two different methods. One was to have the
Comparable Worth Steering Committee (composed of representatives from the Iowa
House, Senate and the governor's staff) establish factor weights independent
of the job evaluation. In fact, however, the committee modified the factor
weights twice after examining their impact on the final results. According to
the Arthur Young Final Report, these alternatives were based, at least in
part, on "the different impacts on male and female jobs" and "the ways the
factors actually acted in determining the final point totals," Such changes
may raise doubts concerning the objectivity of the pay analysis.
Unfortunately, only the final committee weights were reported so no clue on
the direction of change due to the committee revisions was preserved.
In addition to the committee weights, the consultants also' derived
weights based on regressions of pay grades on factor points. Four different
statistically derived weights were reported, one based on the subsample of
female-dominated jobs, one based on the subsample of male-dominated jobs, one
based on all jobs, and a fourth based on all jobs and including the percentage
of female incumbents as a regressor along with the thirteen job
characteristics.
In each case, the factor points were multiplied by the factor weights and
summed to obtain total points for each job. These total points were then
translated into pay grades and pay for each job. Given the many possible
choices of factor weights, it is not surprising that the impact of the
comparable worth plan varied substantially depending upon which procedure was
selected. The average range of assigned pay grades per job classification was
2,4 pay grades for male-dominated jobs and 2.8 pay grades for female-dominated
jobs. Differences between proposed pay grades based on committee assigned
weights versus statistically derived weights of four or five pay grades were
not uncommon.
We estimated that the cost of implementing these plans would have been
about $24 million per year for the committee weights and $1A.4 million per
year for the statistical weights. The costs are exaggerated by the proposed
provision that individuals scheduled for pay cuts would not suffer immediate
losses, but would be 'red circled' (i.e., they would receive no raises until
their pay came in line with other jobs in the system). Allowing for immediate
cuts in pay would have reduced the costs of implementation to about $17.0
million for the plan based on the committee weights and to about $5.6 million
for the plan based on statistical weights.
In essence, the final recommendation from the consultants was the pay
plan based on the committee weights. The report concluded that 10,751
employees should be given pay increases while 7,300 should be decreased.
Seventy-nine percent of female-dominated jobs were scheduled for increases
with AO percent receiving increases of over two pay grades. In contrast, 53
percent of the male-dominated and 48 percent of the mixed classifications were
to be increased, with 17 percent in the male jobs and 19 percent of the mixed
jobs receiving increases of more than two pay grades. Some jobs were
recommended for increases as high as 8 pay grades while others were scheduled
for decreases of as many as 9 pay grades. The median female-dominated job
increased two pay grades versus a one pay grade increase for the median
male-dominated jobs and no change for the median mixed jobs.
The Steering Committee evaluated the Arthur Young recommendations and
concluded that the recommendations required alteration because they "disrupted
state pay scales," The committee then changed the relationship between points
and pay grades in the Arthur Young Plan, The Committee also proposed
implementing the cuts. The result greatly reduced the cost of implementation
to the state to about $11,3 million per year. It should be noted that this
adjustment does not do violence to the comparable worth concept since relative
pay schedules were preserved. Comparable worth says nothing about the level
of pay, only the relative pay of workers with equally valued jobs.
The Arthur Young report was issued in April 1984. The governor signed
the Steering Committee's pay recommendations in Hay 1984. The appeals process
was to be worked out during contract negotiations between the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), the largest
union of State workers, and the State, Negotiations began in July 1984 and
the contract was settled in September 1984, The result was a compromise—the
union did not want pay cuts for the approximately 5,000 union-covered workers
scheduled for such reductions and the State wanted to avoid increasing the
costs of in^leraentation. The con5>romise stipulated that no reductions in pay
grade would be implemented for workers covered by the union contract, but that
those scheduled for pay increases would increase in pay grade but be reduced
by one step in rank. In effect, this meant that the short term pay increases
were reduced, although the full comparable worth increase would be realized
once the workers regained this lost step.
The compromise went into effect in March 1985, although non-Merit
en5>loyee adjustments were not made until July 1985 and higher grade jobs
(especially upper level supervisors) were not put into effect until 1987.
Non-Merit en^loyees (job classes above 9000) were not studied by Arthur Young
but were studied by the State using similar methodology. Unlike Merit
employees, non-Merit employees are not subject to Civil Service testing and
hiring procedures. In addition, pay recommendations for higher pay grades
(above 32) were not implemented until June 1987,
The compromise created an interesting dilemma. Non-contract State
workers were still subject to the increases or decreases mandated by the
con^arable worth law. The result was that comparable jobs would no longer be
con^ensated equally, with 700 non-contract workers schedules to be paid less
than comparably evaluated contract jobs and 1,200 non-contract workers paid
more than comparably evaluated contract jobs. The result was that some
supervisory personnel would be reduced in pay grade at the same time that
their subordinates retained their ^previous pay grade. In some circumstances,
supervisors would have ended up in lower pay grades than their subordinates.
To resolve these problems, the governor directed that the compromise struck in
the union contract would hold for non-contract employees as well, effective
July 1985. We estimate that the final cost of this compromise plan was about
$18.7 million per year.
Thereafter, the appeals process began for the contract and non-contract
workers. In total, A16 contract and non-contract job classifications (363
Merit classes) were appealed, roughly 36 percent of the total number of job
classifications. The breakdown of appeals by sex of the job was similar to
the breakdown of all jobs by sex. Male-dominated jobs represented 59 percent
of all jobs and 55 percent of appeals, while female-dominated jobs represented
roughly 24 percent of all jobs and appeals. The share of union and nonunion
appeals was also proportional to the breakdown of jobs by union status.
Thirty-four percent of jobs liot covered by union contract and 38 percent of
union contract jobs were appealed. The appeals were heard by a panel of five
personnel professionals. The use of individuals experienced in personnel
matters was due, in part, to apparent dissatisfaction with the consistency
obtained from nonprofessionals in the earlier study. A joint labor-management
committee was set up to hear appeals of workers covered by the AFSCME
contract. The appeals process generated pay grade proposals in April (and
November for AFSCME) 1986 ranging from reductions of three pay grades to
8increases of four pay grades. Of the 416 job classes which were appealed, 33
percent were recommended for increases, 28 percent were recommended for
decreases, and no change was recommended for the remaining 39 percent. Jobs
recommended for increases were less likely to be male dominated (A9 percent)
than jobs recommended for decreases (59 percent). On the other hand, jobs
recommended for increases were more likely to be female dominated (32 percent)
than jobs recommended for decreases (13 percent). This suggests that the
appeals recommendations would have further narrowed the gap between male and
female dominated jobs. We estimate the cost of these appeals proposals to be
$23.8 million per year more than the original 1983 plan for Merit job
classifications.
As one might expect, these recommendations were subject to further
negotiations and compromise with the unions involved (Iowa United
Professionals as well as AFSCME). Once again, the recommended pay cuts were
vetoed. However, all recommended increases in pay grade (for 137 job classes)
were in5>leraented in full, unlike 1985. Coincident with the renegotiated union
contracts, these pay increases went into effect at the end of June 1987. A
small number of lUP-covered workers received their adjustments on a deferred
basis in 1988 and 1989. A few AFSCME-covered workers received larger pay
grade adjustments in June 1987 than had been recommended. In addition, the
State in5)lemented pay increases for those higher pay grades (32 and above)
which had not been implemented in 1985, In our statistical analysis we
include all of these adjustments, including those deferred to 1988-89.
However, we do not incorporate additional pay which was granted in 1987 when
the State restored the pay step, since we did not adjust for the step which
was taken away as part of the compromise of 1985. We estimate the cost of
in^Jlementing the 1987 appeals to be $26,2 million per year more than the
original 1983 plan.
II. Hypotheses
As the history of comparable worth in Iowa illustrates, comparable worth
is not a systematic outcome based on job analysis procedures that are
well-established or consistently applied. Although the procedures seemingly
create a pay system based on unbiased objective criteria, the Iowa comparable
worth pay structure was in fact a result of numerous subjective and often
arbitrary decisions. The- outcome is as much as a result of political
expediency, union bargaining and blind luck as it is a result of careful
application of common pay analysis procedures. This is not necessarily the
fault of Arthur Young, since the Arthur Young plan was never implemented. At
minimum, however, it is not at all clear, from studying the process of the
Iowa comparable worth experience, that the final pay plan is less arbitrary or
subjective than the pay structure that existed in 1983. Perhaps this is not
surprising since, by deemphasizing the anchor of an external market, pay must,
of necessity, be based more heavily on opinion regarding the importance and
level of various job characteristics. In essence, then, virtually any pay
structure could be justified, especially when, as in the Iowa case, factor
weights, factor points, and the translation from points to pay grades can be
adjusted after the fact to meet a priori notions of what the results should
be.
Ironically, by the time the dust had finally settled on the Iowa Merit
Pay study, it was not at all clear what the ultimate impact of the effort had
been. In particular, one presumes that women gain relative to men, but the
extent of the gain is unclear. Given the many proposed pay structures, it is
interesting to see what would have happened to male and female earnings had
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the comparable worth proposals been enacted and whether the actual implemented
plan benefited women to the same extent.
A second question is how comparable worth alters the union/nonunion pay^
differential. Some unions, particularly AFSCME, have been strong proponents
of comparable worth, even though the concept would seem risky on the surface.
As the Iowa experience indicates, a large proportion of workers covered by
union contracts could lose as a result of comparable worth. Do unions support
con^arable worth because the studies tend to increase returns to union status
or do unions gain primarily by providing their members with protection against
pay cuts which might have come to fruition under the original Arthur Young
plan?
A third question concerns how comparable worth affects the pay of blacks,
Hispanics and other minorities. By increasing relative earnings for female-
dominated jobs such as clerical occupations, comparable worth plans may tend
to decrease returns to characteristics of blue collar jobs and other
occupations with relatively high numbers of minority incumbents,
A fourth question concerns how comparable worth affects specific
occupations, A presumption is that lower-skill female-dominated jobs gain,
but no consensus exists on other occupations. This study will examine how a
wide variety of broadly defined occupations were affected in Iowa. We will
also examine how professional and supervisory jobs are affected.
^ ^ifth uncertainty in the comparable worth debate is how a comparable
worth pay plan relates to market wages. Since comparable worth studies
attempt to ignore market wages by construction, they should lower the impact
of market forces on public sector wages. On the other hand, the compromises
following the completion of the study could reverse these effects if the
compromises are based in part on market opportunities.
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A sixth important question concerns the impact of comparable worth on the
returns to education and experience. There are several reasons why comparable
worth may be responsible for lowering the returns to a year of education,
tenure, or general labor market experience. The first is that the con^arable
worth pay structure rewards minimum levels of education or ej^erience required
for a job, not the actual level of education or experience of the incumbent.
The in5)licit presumption is that no additional worker productivity is obtained
from having more than the minimum level of preparation. VJhile this is true in
general of rigid pay structures based on job attributes rather than individual
attributes, it is possible that the previous pay structure reflected the
characteristics of the individual in the job as well as the characteristics of
the job itself. This would be particularly true in jobs with only one or two
incumbents. Promotions may depend de facto on having more than the minimal
qualifications, especially for jobs having greater responsibility.
This pay structure is similar to that assumed in the job screening
literature initiated by Spence (1973) and Arrow (1973). In screening models,
certain threshold levels of, say, education, signal a worker's qualifications
to perform a given job. However, additional education is assumed not to
increase the ability of the worker to do the job. If the threshold level of a
given job is set at 12 years of education, then all years of education below
or above the threshold yield no marginal returns. On the other hand,
substantial returns accrue from obtaining exactly the required minimum level.
We would e3q)ect that this pa3mient structure would lower returns to years of
education in general, but would increase returns to specific threshold levels
of education such as high school, college, or Master's Degree diplomas which
are incorporated into the minimum requirements. Similarly, other signals such
as professional licenses or trade school certifications may become more
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valuable under comparable worth. The attainment of a degree may also be
viewed as a more defensible requirement than requiring 11 or 15 years of
education, for instance.
Another reason why comparable worth may lower the returns to education or
experience is the single fact that comparable worth studies attempt to
increase returns to other factors. There is an apparent presumption that once
a factor is identified, it must be accorded a positive weight in computing
total factor points. Therefore, all 13 factors carried a positive weight (of
at least 5 percent out of the total which summed to 100 percent) is the
committee's opinion, even though some factors may have a near-zero impact or
may be considered favorable job attributes for which people are willing to pay
in the form of reduced wages. In the Iowa case, for example, jobs requiring
moderate physical effort are paid more than sedentary, jobs, even though the
former may well be more enjoyable. Highly routinized jobs are paid less than
jobs allowing for flexibility in tasks, even though the latter might seem more
enjoyable. Giving positive weights to potentially favorable job attributes on
statistically insignificant job attributes in the pay structure requires that
some job attributes must be lowered in relative importance.
This effect on the returns to education or experience will presumably be
larger when committee weights rather than statistically derived weights are
used. Even if redundant, unimportant, or favorable job factors are introduced
in a statistical model, the statistically derived weights will presumably be
small or negative. On the other hand, the committee weights force the in^acts
of the job characteristics on pay to be positive. The weights for even the
least important characteristics in the Iowa case were 5 percent of the total,
and this is similar to the weights placed on the least in^ortant factors
elsewhere.
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III. Methodology
The goal of this study is to ea^lore the impacts of proposed and
implemented variations of comparable worth on the Iowa pay structure. It is
important that this analysis be performed in a way that isolates the impacts
of the change in the pay system without simultaneously allowing other factors
to change. If, for example, implementation of the new pay structure causes
some employees to quit and others to enter the State system, then a comparison
of pay structures before and after implementation will be biased by
differences in the sample of employees. Furthermore, any methodology that
takes a snapshot of the pay structure before and after comparable worth will
run into problems of biases due to changes in other exogenous influences such
as business cycles and political elections which may also alter the state pay
structure. These snapshots also would fail to capture the full impacts of
comparable worth since these plans may be introduced gradually or may not be
implemented in full, such as the Iowa case.
We solve these problems by utilizing the December 1983 pay schedule which
existed before the comparable worth study was initiated. By determining the
individual's actual 1983 pay grade and the number of pay grades which the
individual would have increased or decreased due to coii5)arable worth, we
computed what the individual's corresponding biweekly earnings would have been
in 1983 under each of the alternate plans. Given the recommended pay grades,
we could compute six different earnings rates for each employee: (1) the
actual 1983 earnings, (2) the earnings rate associated with the final Arthur
Young Committee recommendations, (3) the earnings rate associated with the
Arthur Young Statistical Analysis, (A) the earnings rate associated with the
1985 implemented State/AFSCME compromise plan, (5) the earnings rate
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associated with the appeals recommendations, and (6) the earnings rate
associated with the 1987 implemented appeals plan. In this way, our analysis
avoids the biases associated with entry and exit, business cycles, inflation,
and other changes which occur over time.
To explore how comparable worth altered the earnings structure in the
Iowa Merit System, we utilize the standard earnings function approach
pioneered by Jacob Mincer (1974), Earnings are presumed to be related to
individual and job characteristics according to:
InW^. = +bJ^X. +c^Z. +e^. (1)
IJ 0 0 1 0 j IJ
where is the natural logarithm of the biweekly wage of individual i in
job classification j in pay plan k, represents a set of socioeconomic
characteristics for individual i, and represents a set of job
characteristics. For our purposes, elements of the set of variables are
common elements of the standard human capital model of earnings such as
individual education, experience, and job tenure (see Willis, 1986, for a
• Ic k Icsurvey of this literature). The a^, b^ and Cq are parameters specific to pay
plan k, and e^^ is the error term. The regression coefficients can be
interpreted as the percentage change in earnings associated with a one-unit
change in a given characteristic, holding the other characteristics constant.
The coefficients can be compared across pay schedules to determine how the
percentage returns are affected by comparable worth.
Another way of making these comparisons is to explain the difference in
pay between a comparable worth plan (W^) and the actual 1983 pay plan (W°),
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using the form:
InW^. - InW?. = +b^, + c^Z. + u^. (2)
ij ij 1 1 1 1 j ij '
ic IcIn this case, the and c^ measure the percentage increase in wages in the
pay plan relative to the 1983 wage, W?.. Apositive coefficient implies
that the characteristic "wins" as a result of comparable worth, while a
negative coefficient means that the returns to the characteristic fall.
A third statistic we use to illustrate the effects of these different pay
plans is to generate predicted male-female wage differentials for each pay
plan, holding constant individual and/or job characteristics. Equation (1) is
estimated alternatively over a sample of males and a sample of female
incianbents. Weighting the female characteristics by their respective
estimated male earnings structure coefficients yields an estimate of the
earnings a woman would receive had her individual and job characteristics been
rewarded at the male rate. Similarly, by weighting male characteristics by
their respective female earnings structure coefficients yields an estimate of
j, the earnings a male would receive if he were rewarded at the female rate.
The average of the estimates:
InW^?. - InW?. and (3)
iJ ^ ^
InW?. - InW?.
3-J ij
yield estimates of the percentage difference in earnings between men and
women
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under the various pay plans, holding individual and/or job characteristics
fixed. These estimates have long been used as indicators of market
discrimination. Positive estimates, are consistent with discrimination against
females and negative numbers are consistent with discrimination against
males^
IV. Data
In order to explore the hj^otheses and questions presented in Section II,
we required data on individual characteristics of the employees in the Iowa
Merit Pay System, information on job classifications, pay grade and pay step
of these employees, information on pay grade designations for the various
proposed and implemented pay plans, and measures of market wages of jobs most
closely related to jobs in the State system. Little of this data was
available in published form, so we had to piece the data set together from
several sources.
Our sources of information on individual pay grades, job classifications,
job step, pay plan and biweekly pay in 1983 were obtained from the Iowa
Department of Revenue and Finance pa3rroll tapes. These tapes also yielded
information on an employee's race, sex, marital status, age, and employment
date with the State, Information on whether an employee held professional or
supervisory status, whether the individual was covered by a union contract,
and whether the individual paid dues to a union or professional society
through payroll deductions was also available from this source.
The Department of Personnel's record files were the source of individual
educational background and work history data. All application forms and
promotion forms are contained in these files. Because hirings and promotions
are based in part on levels of eaqjerience and education, employees have an
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incentive to keep their personnel files updated.
Because the files are not computerized, we were not able to obtain data
on each individual. Instead, we randomly selected from 100 to 125 files from
each file drawer, resulting in a sample of roughly 5,000 individuals. From
the application forms, we collected information on years of education, work
experience prior to State emplo3mient, military experience, vocational
training, professional licenses, advanced degrees and time spent out of the
labor force.
We then merged the information from the personnel files with the data
from the payroll tape. Our final sample size was 3,734. The major cause of
the reduction in sample size was that individuals who we selected from the
personnel files and who were hired after 1983 would not show up on the 1983
payroll tape. Some observations were lost due to incomplete information from
either the payroll or personnel files. We also reduced the sample by
excluding individuals who earned less that $200 in a two week period due to
some difficulties in obtaining information on their actual hours worked.
Finally, we excluded employees with job classifications above 9000 since these
were not included in the Arthur Young study. These classifications represent
non-Merit employees—people who can be hired without going through the formal
service screening procedures. Other than undersampling employees on
part-time status, our sample is very consistent with the overall distribution
of Merit employees by sex, race, and broad occupational designation. The
final sample of 3,734 employees is roughly one-fifth of the approximately
18,000 State government employees in 1983, excluding the University Regents
System.
The final report of the Arthur Young study yielded information on the
factor points for each of the 13 job factors for each of the job
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classifications in the Merit System, The Study also published the pay grades
for each classification under the Steering Committee factor weights and the
statistically derived factor weights. The State provided us with lists of the
pay grades for each job classification as implemented in 1985, the pay grades
and revised factor points for classifications that were appealed and the pay
grades for those jobs which were changed in 1987, These various proposed and
implemented sets of pay grades were translated into biweekly wages using the
1983 pay plans which were also provided to us by the State. Our calculations
held constant the individual's step in the pay plan. To be precise, biweekly
pay under plan "X" was computed as PAYX = (MWX + CIWX*STEP) )*80 where MWX is
the minimum hourly pay in the grade proposed under plan X, IWX is the average
increment per step in hourly pay in the grade proposed under plan X, and we
assume 80 work hours biweekly. This formula was used for all except
professional and managerial workers who had no formal step. For the latter,
biweekly pay was simply calculated as PAYX = (MWX/MW83)*PAY83 where MW83 is
the minimum hourly pay in the 1983 pay plan and PAY83 is the individual's
actual 1983 biweekly pay. Of course, PAYX = PAY83 for those job
classifications which were never recommended for a change under a comparable
worth plan. The State also provided tabulations by job of the number of males
employed and females employed as of January 1984,
Information on market wages for each of the job classifications was
obtained from several sources. The bulk of the data on market wages was
obtained from the Job Service of Iowa, Wage Survey: Iowa Statewide 1983. By
matching job descriptions in the State Merit System with occupational
descriptions in the Job Services Survey, we were able to determine the market
job most closely associated with the job in the State system. The median of
the market wages in the occupations is used as the proxy for the opportunity
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costs of being employed with the State. For some occupations, primarily law
enforcement, lawyers, and parks and recreation, the median of wages in city
and county government (Iowa Office of Planning and Programming, Iowa Local
Government Salary and Benefit Survey 1983) were used to proxy market
opportunities, Ojpportunity costs for teachers and principals were provided by
information obtained from the Iowa State Education Association and the Iowa
Association of School Boards. The remaining market wages for doctors,
dentists, scientists, therapists and beauticians were obtained from the
detailed summaries of the 1983 Current Population Surveys. Except for
beauticians, these are all professions for which national labor markets may be
arguably presumed to exist. In a few cases in which a progression of jobs was
apparent (i.e.. Clerk 1, Clerk 2, Clerk 3, Clerk A), we used median entry
level wages for the lowest job in the progression.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in our
analysis. Over 49,9 percent of our sample are FEMALES which differs only
I
slightly from the 47.3 percent prior to sampling. By contrast, private sector
and local government units had work forces which were 42 percent female (in
1980), Exactly 2 percent of our sample are MINORITIES (Black, Hispanic, or
American Indians),
The average employee in our sample was 40,4 years old, had 13,3 years of
EDUCATION, 8.5 years of non-State work EXPERIENCE, and 8.3 years of TENURE
with the State. Overall, 26 percent were college graduates, 5.3 percent had
MS degrees, and 1.2 percent had PHD's. In our sample, 13.2 percent were.
SUPERVISORS and 20.5 percent were PROFESSIONALS. Because of problems
encountered in generating biweekly equivalent pay for part-time workers, our
sample is predominently (97.7 percent) FULL-TIME workers. Overall. 6.5
percent had occupational LICENSES, 19,6 percent had some VOCATIONAL training.
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and 21.8 percent had MILITARY experience. In total, 33.9 percent were SINGLE
and employees averaged 1.1 YEARS OUT of the labor force after starting post
school einplo3nnent.
We have three measures of union status. In our san^le 77.A percent were
in jobs which were covered by UNION contracts. Approximately 15.2 percent of
our sample paid DUES to (non-professional) unions and an additional 3,4
percent paid ASSOC. DUES to professional associations through a payroll
checkoff. On average, State employees in our sample were paid $636.14
biweekly (W) in December 1983. This corresponds to an hourly rate of $7.95
and an annual rate of $16,540.
Table 1 also provides means and standard deviations separately for each
sex. In 1983, women averaged 78.7 percent of the average biweekly male wage.
This would have increased to 87.0-88.0 percent under the two Arthur Young
Plans but actually increased to 82.9 percent upon the 1985 implementation.
Women average 13.1 years of school as compared to 13.5 years for males. Males
are much more likely to have an M.S. or a PH.D., while women are more likely
to have a license or vocational training. Men averaged 9.7 years of tenure
with the State and an additional 10.5 years of non-State work experience.
Women worked less, having 7.0 years of tenure and 6.5 years of other
experience on average. Likewise women had 2.0 years out of the labor force
versus only 0,3 years for men. Men were more likely to be supervisors and
professionals. Although men were no more likely than women to be covered by a
collective bargaining contract, men were more likely to be dues paying
members. Women were much more likely to be single and were slightly younger
(39.5 years old) than men (41.4 years old).
Using our measures of opportunity wages, women averaged a $6.61 market
wage while men averaged $9,16. Interpreted literally, female employees would
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have been paid 27.8 percent less than men in alternative market jobs but were
only paid 22.1 percent less in their State jobs in 1983. This may suggest
that the State was less discriminatory towards women even before comparable
worth, or it may reflect a different set of personal characteristics hired by
noTi^State employers. Female State employees were more likely to be
concentrated in female jobs as expected. The average value for "% Female Job*'
was .79 for women and .21 for men.
V. Results
An examination of sample means indicates that public employees gain on
average from comparable worth. Although some would have suffered pay cuts
under the Arthur Young/Committee Proposal, the average employee in our saii5)le
would have gained $35.57 biweekly ($925 per year). Had this plan been
implemented, 10 percent of the employees would have gained $3,515 per year
while another 10 percent would have lost $1,380 or more per year. Under the
I
Arthur Young Statistical Plan the average gain would have only been $11.90
biweekly ($309 per year) with 10 percent gaining $2,382 or more per year and
10 percent losing $1,955 or more per year.
As discussed earlier, the State/AFSCME compromise of 1985 eliminated all
pay cuts in exchange for moderating the pay increase. On average, biweekly
pay increased $39.74 ($1,033 annually) with 10 percent receiving more that
$2,850 annually. Remember that all of our analysis is in terms of the 1983
pay schedules so that these represent estimates of real pay changes, not just
nominal pay changes. The Appeals recommendations would have gone further,
raising pay an average of $50.63 biweekly ($1,316 annually) with 10 percent
gaining $2,955 or more per year and 5 percent losing $728 or more per year.
The 1987 implementation of the appeals recommendations eliminated the pay cuts
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so that the actual pay gain was $55.90 biweekly ($1,453 annually) with 10
percent gaining $2,955 or more per year.
A. Tabulations
Table 2 provides more detailed data on average annual pay changes
tabulated by several demographic and human capital variables. Under all
plans, women gained considerably more than did men. Jobs which were 41
percent female or higher gained substantially more than jobs which were only
0-40 percent female under all plans. In fact, en^jloyees in the latter jobs
would have lost pay on average had the Arthur Young reconimendation been
implemented. As for the racial impacts, the earnings gap between minorities
and whites increased as a result of all the pay plans,, except for the
Committee proposal where the relative white gains were essentially zero.
As expected, the least educated and those with the least tenure gained
the most. Under the Arthur Young Committee plan, college graduates would have
lost income. An exception to the pattern occurs for those having less than
twelve years of schooling under the Statistical plan who would have suffered
an absolute loss of income. While raising everyone, the most highly educated
and those with the longest tenure fared better under the appeals process than
they had under the previous plans. Similar but less pronounced effects occurs
for (non-State government) work e3q>erience. The most e:q>erienced en^loyees
would have lost income under the Arthur Young Statistical Plan.
There is also a clear tendency for those with the lowest paying market
alternatives to gain the most. Under the Statistical Plan those earning more
than $8.99 per hour would have lost'income. The compromise plan shrinks the
gains to the lowest wage occupations while benefiting higher wage occupations,
but the pattern of larger relative increases for the lower paid occupations
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remains. It is interesting that the appeals proposal would have cut pay among
the most highly paid group.
Workers in health, clerical, social services, liquor stores, and
education consistently gained the most under virtually all plans. These
occupations also had relatively high proportions of female incumbents. At the
other end of the spectrum, workers in computation, finance, transportation,
regulation, employment services and law enforcement jobs would have lost
income under the committee plan and gained the least under the more recent
plans. Note that the only groups to lose pay under the appeals proposal was
computational services. These jobs tended toward higher concentrations of
male incumbents. Supervisors and professionals would have gained the least
under the Arthur Young Committee plan but actually did better under the
compromise and the Appeals plans.
Unions would have gained under the Committee proposal but would have lost
relative to those not covered by a union contract under the Statistical Plan.
The 1985 compromise resulted in a very slight relative loss for unions.
However, the appeals process would have reversed this outcome. When
disaggregated by union dues status, the two Arthur Young plans again produced
differing recommendations, with dues payers gaining only under the Committee
plan. On the other hand, both regular and association dues paying members
gain upon implementation and as a result of the appeals process.
Although strongly suggestive, the simple averages reported in this
section should not be overemphasized since no control variables are utilized.
We now report the results of our multivariate regression analysis in which
individual effects can be estimated while holding other variables constant.
B. Human Capital Model
2A
The basic results for equation (1) are reported in column 1 of Table 3«
The estimates are very consistent (at least in sign) with wage equations
estimated by other economists. This implies that wage patterns for state
government en^loyees in Iowa do not differ fundamentally from wage patterns
typically studied in the private sector for the United States as a whole. In
particular, the 1983 regression indicates that pay increases significantly
with most of the educational and work experience variables, as well as the
market wage and union status. Overall, the human capital model performs very
well, explaining 81 percent of the variation in the logarithm of the wage
rates.
Women in Iowa State government earned 21 percent less than men on average
without using, control variables. However, women earned only A percent less
than men after controlling for human capital and market wage variables, and 12
percent less than men after controlling for human capital variables except the
market wage. As found in other studies, women earn less primarily because
they have less human capital on average and because they tend to be employed
in lower paying jobs relative to men.
An identical model was estimated using cross-section data for each of the
comparable worth pay plans as shown in columns 2-6 of Table 3, The estimates
are very similar in sign and significance. However, the R drops indicating
that the human capital model is less useful in explaining the comparable worth
plans. This is not surprising in that variables such as market wages,
education and experience were given lower weights under the comparable worth
process.
It is easier to contrast the comparable worth pay structures with the
original 1983 pay structure by examining estimates of equation (2). These are
presented in columns 7-11 of Table 3. The dependent variable is the
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difference between the proposed comparable worth pay level and the original
1983 pay level.
Of most interest, women gain relative to the 1983 pay plan. The Arthur
Young Plans would have narrowed the underpayments by 2.8 (Committee) and 8,8
(Statistical) percentage points while the 1985 compromise narrowed the gap by
0.7 points. The main explanation for the smaller relative gain for women in
the compromise plan is undoubtedly the fact that no jobs (especially male
jobs) suffered pay cuts upon enactment. The Appeals recommendation would have
been more similar to the committee plan, narrowing the gap by 2.0 points, but
this was reduced to a 1.4 point gain on implementation in 1987.
Table'3 also provides insights concerning the relationship between the
control variables and the pay plans. We hypothesized that comparable worth
would deemphasize education and work experience and the results support that
expectation. The Arthur Young Committee Flan, the 1985 compromise plan, and
.both of the appeals plans reduced the magnitude of the education, experience,
and tenure coefficients, although not always significantly. On the other
hand, there is evidence that these same plans placed increased emphasis on
credentials or diplomas as opposed to years of education. This is consistent
with our expectation that comparable worth plans would tend to move the pay
structure closer to the form typically assumed in the job signaling
literature. This is particularly true for the Ph.D. degree and for licenses,
and somewhat less so for vocational training and the M.S. degree.
The pattern is different for the Arthur Young Statistical Plan. This
plan tended to strengthen the importance of education, tenure, and e3q>erience.
Recall that the consultants used regression methods to fit the data and
estimate the factor weights whereas all of the other plans relied more heavily
on the subjective evaluations of the committee as well as political compromise
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to determine appropriate pay grade adjustments. This reeraphasizes how
sensitive the results are to the determination of the weights. We also note
that although the Statistical Plan would have strengthened the importance of
credentials like Ph.D. and license, its impact is much smaller in magnitude
than the other plans, and the Statistical Plan would have deen^hasized the
M.S. degree.
All plans significantly deemphasize the role of market wages as a
determinant of government pay. The market wage was introduced in log form so
that it is easy to interpret the coefficient as an elasticity. The Arthur
Young Committee plan would have reduced the influence of market wages by 57
percent relative to the 1983 plan. The compromise plan did reintroduce some
of the market's influence, but the market wage coefficient still declined
relative to the 1983 plan by one-third on implementation. Even in the most
extreme case, the Arthur Young pay plan would still have retained a
statistically significant relationship to market wages,'with a 10 percent
increase in the market wage associated with a 1.5 percent increase in state
pay. It is interesting that the Statistical Plan would have diminished the
role of market wages the least of all plans.
We hypothesized that unions would attempt to use the comparable worth
process to their favor. This is not as clear for the Arthur Young plans where
we see positive but small and insignificant effects for the Committee plan and
a negative significant impact for the Statistical plan. It is notable,
however, that the plan implemented in 1985, which was a compromise between the
Governor and the union, significantly boosted the pay of those covered by
union contracts. The Appeals process benefited unions even more. Dues paying
union members received an even larger increase above that going to union
contract workers as a whole under all plans except the Statistical Plan where
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they lost 4.8 percentage points. The results for the Association Dues
variable are consistent in sign with the other two union variables, but only
attains statistical significance under each of the Appeals plans. Interpreted
literally, those both covered by union contracts and paying dues to the union
gained up to 2.5 percentage points in pay as a result of the compromise. Such
union members did even better as a result of the appeals process, especially
members of professional associations who gained 7.3 percentage points in
1987.
The Arthur Young plan proposed placing greater emphasis on supervisory
tasks and this carried through upon implementation and appeals. Professionals
also gained increased importance upon implementation and appeals, despite
negative recommendations by the Arthur Young consultants.
Members of minority groups lost a little over one percent of their
earnings relative to whites under all plans, although this is not
statistically significant. Military experience tended to be deemphasized by
the Arthur Young Plan and the Appeals Plan, although there were no significant
impacts upon implementation. Full-time employment was also deemphasized by
the Arthur Young committee recommendation, but had small positive coefficients
in other cases. Single employees and those with more years out of the labor
force also appear to suffer some reductions in pay as a result of comparable
worth, but the magnitudes of the reductions are small and usually lack
statistical significance.
It must be emphasized that here we are analyzing the partial impact of an
individual variable while holding other variables constant. Thus, when we
refer to losses by more educated workers or by minority workers, for instance,
we mean that these people received relatively smaller pay increases than did
the less educated or whites other things constant. It must be stressed that
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since the 1985 compromise eliminated all pay cuts, no workers faced losses in
absolute terms.
C. Comparable Worth Model
Comparable worth advocates might argue that a better specification of our
earnings function would delete the market wage and add a variable which
measures the proportion of each job classification which is female. According
to this perspective, the market wage should be excluded because it reflects
existing sex discrimination in the private labor market. Since the purpose of
comparable worth is to eliminate sex discrimination, they argue that market
wage information should be ignored in evaluating pay. In the place of market
wages, the specification should control for the proportion of each job
classification which is female, holding constant the extent to which women are
over or under-represented in a job category.
It is interesting to observe the extent to which our conclusions are
altered when we incorporate these two changes into the earnings equations.
The results are available in Table 4. In virtually all cases, our conclusions
2
are reaffirmed. However, a few comments may be appropriate. The R for the
1983 pay structure drops from .81 to .77 for the 1983 regression, indicating
that market wages were an important determinant of government pay. In this
formulation, it appears that the Arthur Young Committee plan would have
significantly improved the pay of union employees and dues payers. The
earlier gains for professional workers resulting from the 1985 implementation
and the appeals no longer appear while the gains for Ph.D.'s and the
vocationally trained are no longer statistically significant. The previous
conclusions that the Arthur Young Statistical plan would strengthen the Human
Capital coefficients and reduce earnings of unionists are reaffirmed.
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The main interest in comparing the earlier human capital regressions with
this specification is in examining the implications for the pay for women
relative to men. By excluding market wages and including the percent of
female incumbents on the job, the coefficient estimate on the female dummy
variable in the pay level regressions become positive but not significantly
different from zero, and the comparable worth plans . (except the Statistical
Plan) actually appear to lower the relative pay for individual females.
However, the 1983 pay level coefficient on percent of female incumbents in the
job classification is negative and quite large in absolute value. Taken
literally, this coefficient implies that incumbents in 100 percent female
classifications were paid 26 percent less than comparably skilled incumbents
in 100 percent male classifications. The Arthur Young plans would have cut
the pay difference to 6-9 percent, but the compromise plan cut the pay
difference only to 17.5 percent. The Appeals Plan would have done slightly
better with a 15-17 percent differential. This implies that women received
lower pay because they were in "female jobs" which paid less. There was no
evidence of additional discrimination against women as individuals.
The comparison of the results of Tables 3 and A clearly illustrate the
nature of the debate regarding the validity of claims that female-dominated
jobs are systematically undervalued by the market. Proponents of human
capital or market explanations could point to the results of Table 3 and claim
that measured discrimination against women is very slight controlling for
hviman capital and labor market demand and supply factors. Proponents of
comparable worth could point to the results of Table Aand claim that large
discrepancies in pay exist between men and women because women are
concentrated in jobs which are paid below the value placed on comparable male
jobs. The data support both claims, and therefore any assessment that one
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view dominates the other must rest on faith and not statistical analysis. We
can, however, conclude that the standard market explanation performs at least
as well as the comparable worth explanation.
D. Human Capital-Job Attributes Model
As an additional sensitivity test, we reestimated the earnings equations
by adding to our original model both the percent female variable and the
thirteen job factors developed as part of the Arthur Young study. The latter
attempt to measure attributes of each job, such as working environment,
responsibility, physical and mental demands of the job, and minimum
requirements in terms of education and experience. Advocates would tend to
emphasize these variables in that they feel that salaries should be pegged to
attributes of the job rather than attributes of the individuals. Our purpose
is not to debate this issue, but to measure the impact of comparable worth on
individuals. By holding constant job attributes and percent female, we can
determine whether our conclusions are sensitive to the inclusion of these
variables. With a few exceptions, our conclusions do not change.
Some might question our strategy of regressing proposed wage rates on job
attributes in the sense that Arthur Young generated their pay proposals from
these same job attributes. These thirteen variables should explain most of
the variations in pay under their proposal. On the other hand, this should
not be a problem for the 1983 pay structure since it existed prior to the
Arthur Young study. Nor should it be as much of a problem for the 1985
implementation since political compromises partially distorted the
relationship between factor points and pay. Nevertheless, it is important to
keep in mind that these regressions will yield information on the changes in
marginal returns to personal characteristics above and beyond the changes due
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directly to the formal comparable worth process of measuring and weighting job
factors.
Our estimates are presented in Table 5. The regression for 1983 pay is
in column 1 and may be contrasted with the comparable estimates of Tables 3
and 4, First, it is clear that even in 1983, the job attributes add a lot to
2
the explanatory power. The R rises from .815 to .931 and 12 out of 13 job
attributes are statistically significant. It is also interesting that all
have positive coefficients except physical effort and pace of work (which is
not significant). Interpreted literally, the 11 positive job attributes
appear to be measuring aspects of the job which are undesirable features and
which require compensation in order to attract applicants, whereas physical
effort appears to be a desirable job attribute. Of course, we must modify
this conclusion to the extent that political or other non-economic forces
created the pay structure. We also note that the complexity and the scope of
the job have the largest positive impact on pay.
Many of the human capital and personal characteristic coefficients
decline in absolute value while retaining their sign and significance. This
is not surprising in that some of these variables compete with certain job
attribute variables. For instance, the minimum education job attribute
competes with years of education as well as the credential variables.
Furthermore, the comparable worth pay plans represent a conscious effort to
downplay individual characteristics and emphasize job characteristics. Still,
few significant sign reversals occur. The supervisor variable changes from
positive to negative when the supervisory job factors are added. The only
other coefficients which change sign are those for the MS, military, and
minority variables. For the most part, these coefficients remain
insignificant. Even controlling for the percent female job variable, the
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individual female variable is now negative and significant, albeit small in
magnitude«
The market wage response elasticities decline in magnitude once the job
factors are added. In 1963, a 10 percent increase in market wages increased
State pay by only 1.2 percent (versus 3.5 percent from Table 3). It is not
surprising that once the institutional factors which determine pay are
included, the impact of the market pay variable declines. Nor is it
surprising that each comparable worth plan reduced the impact of market wages
even further (a 5.6 to 8.6 percent impact in Table 5).
It is clear that both the individual attributes and the job attributes
contribute to the e:q>lanation of variation in 1983 pay levels. In general,
the human capital variables retain their expected signs and significance when
the job attributes are introduced. F-tests indicate that each joint set of
variables significantly contribute to the explanation of the dependent
variable. This strongly implies that both external competitive markets and
internal pay determination are important.
As before, estimates of the percent female coefficient imply major gains
for female jobs under the comparable worth plans relative to 1983. Whereas
100 percent female jobs were paid 14.6 percent less than 100 percent male jobs
in 1983, this is narrowed to 5.8 percent less upon implementation. The Arthur
Young Committee plan would have totally eliminated the pay gap between jobs,
although individual females would have been paid 0.8 percent less, as was
especially true under all of the pay plans. It is interesting that the
Statistical Plan would have reversed "discrimination," such that female jobs
would have been paid more than equivalent male jobs. The appeals process
would have left female jobs underpaid, but only by 1,7 to 3.A percentage
points.
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Comparable worth still tends to reduce the importance of years of
education and experience, while increasing the importance of credentials. An
exception is the appeals proposal which strengthened education. However,
several of the coefficientis are no longer statistically significant, probably
due to competition from the job factors. On the other hand, job tenure
appears to become more important under all comparable worth plans aside from
the 1985 in5)leraentation. Supervisors still gain from comparable worth, but
professionals lose relative to non-professionals.
A major change occurs for the union variables. In the earlier estimates,
it appeared that those covered by a union contract and those paying union dues
gained, at least from the 1985 compromise and from the appeals. However, once
the job factors are added, unions appear to lose relative to nonunion workers.
All ten pay difference coefficients are negative (nine are significant) in
Table 5 for the Union and Dues Variables. On the other hand, dues paying
association members clearly lost only under the 1985 implementation but gained
from the appeals process. This suggests that the union gains occurred
primarily through the establishment and weighting of the job factors. We
should emphasize that our earlier estimates obtained from the human capital
earnings equation yield more meaningful estimates of the total gains to union
members as a result of the comparable worth process in that the coefficients
on union status include gains that resulted from the factor point system.
In order to test this h5rpothesis, we regressed total factor points on the
individual and human capital variables. Total factor points were con5)uted by
the Arthur Young consultants using the Committee weights to sum the thirteen
job factors. As presented in Table 1, the mean is 268.4 points with females
averaging 41.2 points less than males. The results are reported in Table 6
for three alternative specifications which differ according to whether "%
34
Female Job" and the log of "Market Wage" are included or excluded. Overall,
these specifications explain 66 to 70 percent of the variation in total factor
points, and the F-tests are clearly statistically significant. As expected,
total factor points are positively related to the variables which the
comparable worth pay analysis considered such as education, tenure,
credentials, and supervisory status. Somewhat surprising is the result that
there also are significant coefficients for the Female, Years Out,
Professional, Full-Time, Union, Dues, and Market Wage variables. These are
variables which the comparable worth process was not supposed to explicitly
consider. Part of the interpretation has to be that these individual
characteristics are correlated with job factors. For instance, professionals
rank high on job complexity (JCPX) and women tend to be concentrated in the
lower ranked jobs. However, it may also be true that some groups were able to
affect the con^arable worth process to their group's benefit. Our results are
consistent with the interpretation that unions (and professionals and others)
gained directly through their participation in the job evaluation and factor
weighting process. Of course, our results are also consistent with the
interpretation that these groups gained indirectly simply because their
members happened to have characteristics which were correlated with highly
rated job factors.
Returning to Table 5, we note that comparable worth increased some job
factors in importance while reducing others. There is no clear pattern of
change. The minimum educational requirement (JED) increased in importance
under con^arable worth and yet the con^lexity of the duties (JCPX) decreased
in importance. Work hazards (JHAZ) increased in weight while the job
environment (JENV) declined, except under the appeals process. However,
comparable worth did tend to increase the role of the job factors. Sixty
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percent of them had positive coefficients in the pay difference regressions of
Table 5.
Overall, adding the job factors reaffirms our previous conclusions. The
market wage is significantly reduced in importance. Years of education and
experience are also reduced while credentials gain in importance. Female jobs
gain a lot relative to male-dominated jobs.
E, Job Attributes Model
We have also estimated a regression model which controls only for the job
attributes while measuring the impact of comparable worth on female earnings.
Such a model might be most consistent with the approach of those who view the
wage process as that of setting entry level wages on the basis of job
characteristics. In this view, individual and human characteristics may be
viewed as secondary or irrelevant, although in a broader perspective we would
argue that individual and market factors play a role in defining job classes
as well as qualification reguirements. Job classes may be created to meet
competitive needs to raise salaries and to provide incentives for employees
who are at the top of their pay range to remain with the State.
Our regression estimates are presented in Table 7. These results are not
directly comparable with our previous estimates because the dependent variable
has been redefined as minimum pay (at the lowest step) rather than actual pay
(which incorporates step increases), This change was made because we felt
that it would be more consistent with the way in which factor points are used
to set minimum pay for each job classification. As a consequence, the is
not directly comparable with the previous tables.
Despite these differences, it is notable that the coefficients on the
"% Female Job" variable follow the same pattern as before. In 1983, ICQ
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percent female jobs paid 20.6 percent less than totally male jobs. As before,
the Arthur Young plans would have eliminated most of the pay gap, with the
Statistical plan being more generous to women. The other plans were
compromises with an 8.4 and 7.0 percent gap remaining after the 1985 and 1987
implementations, respectively. As before, the "Female" variable has a small
and insignificant negative coefficient.
F. Regressions by Sex and Predicted Pay Ratios
An alternative mode of analysis is to measure the ratio of female pay to
male pay. This gives us some notion of the extent to which women are
"underpaid" relative to men and the degree to which the comparable worth plans
alter this ratio.
As a start we refer to the first row of Table 8. This row simply shows
the ratio of average female to average male pay uncontrolled for differences
in individual or job characteristics of employees. In 1983 women earned 79%
of the average male earnings in Iowa government, which is higher than the 69%
figure which is frequently cited for the U.S. as a whole. Similar ratios were
computed for each of the four comparable worth plans. The Arthur Young
recommendations would have raised the ratio to the .87-.88 range.
Implementation only went half way towards meeting these recommendations. The
uncontrolled appeals recommendation was slightly more generous at .84, but any
additional gain was lost upon implementation in 1987.
Although suggestive, these ratios would be more meaningful if we
controlled for the major differences in characteristics between men and women.
In order to achieve this goal, we employed the procedure discussed in the
methodology section. First we estimated wage equations separately by sex.
Using one of these equations to represent the pay structures, we simply plug
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in the individual characteristics of the other sex in order to predict what
they would have been paid under that pay structure. These predicted values
can then be compared with actual pay as shown in Equation (3).
Throughout this section we should caution the reader that although such
estimated pay gaps are often associated with sex discrimination, in fact the
gap may be due to differences in terms of any unmeasured variable. It may not
be due to discrimination as popularly conceived.
The pay level regressions are reported separately for males and female in
Table 9. The basic human capital variables (excluding the female dummy
variable) are utilized so that Table 9 is comparable to Table 3, In this
specification, the model fits the data for women just as well (or better) than
it fits the data for men in 1983. However, it is interesting that for each
comparable worth plan (except the Statistical Plan), the R for the female
equation is smaller than for the male equation. Using goodness of fit as a
criterion, one might attach somewhat more confidence in predictions of female
pay using the male equation.
Comparing coefficients, the payoff to additional education is
consistently higher for males than for females. However, this is offset to
some extent by higher payoffs to credentials (MS, Ph.D, and Licenses) for
females. As one might expect, there is little or no difference between the
sexes in the return' to job tenure with the State. Nor does there appear to be
any clear difference for prior work Experience or for Years Out of the labor
force, both of which tend to be insignificant. We also find that females gain
more from being union members and from paying dues than males under all pay
plans. This is consistent with the frequent conclusion that unions raise the
pay of the lowest paid groups the most. Somewhat surprising is our finding |
that the pay for women tended to be more responsive to market wages.
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Controlling for the human capital variables eliminates most of the pay
gap. Using the male equation to predict female pay in 1983 yields a pay ratio
.of .951 as seen in Row 2 of Table 8. This ratio is .983 when the female
equation is used to predict male pay (Row 3). We view these estimates as more
meaningful than the uncontrolled ratios of Row 1« Interpreted literally,
estimates imply that there was very little pay discrimination in Iowa State
Government in 1983. Prior to con5)arable worth, women were underpaid by at
most 5%.
All of the comparable worth plans tended to raise female pay relative to
males. The Arthur Young Committee plan would have equalized pay between the
sexes while their Statistical plan would have favored women by up to 7
percent. As expected, implementation in 1985 was not as generous, raising the
estimated pay ratios only to .96-.99. The Appeals proposal moved slightly
closer to equality of pay, but implementation of the appeals in 1987 provided
little additional gain beyond what had been achieved as of 1985.
We also performed our sensitivity analysis on these estimates. Ratios
based on the Comparable Worth model excluding market wages (and excluding the
percent female job variable) are reported in Rows 4-5 of Table 8. Rows 6-7
report estimates for the Human Capital-Job Attributes model which includes the
job factors as well as market wages (but excludes percent female). These
results are based on regressions using market wage (not in log form) but our
esqjerience is that this only makes minor changes in the third decimal place.
For each model, pay level regressions, were estimated separately for male and
females. These regressions are not reproduced in this paper because of their
similarity to those reported in Tables A, 5, and 9 but will be supplied on
request.
In each case, the 1983 estimated pay ratios are lower than those
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estimated using the Human Capital model but still considerably larger than the
uncontrolled pay ratios. For instance, deleting the market vage creates a pay
gap of 10-12 percent which is still small compared to the uncontrolled gap of
21 percent. Controlling for job factors, market wages, and individual
characteristics yields a pay gap of only 3.5-8.2 percent.
As before, the Arthur Young recommendations would have aided women more
than did implementation or the Appeals process. One small surprise occurs
when the job factors are introduced. In this case, the estimates imply that
the Arthur Young committee recommendation would have been (slightly) more
generous than the Statistical recommendation. The opposite was true for all
other estimates.
Overall the results in this sectioh strongly reinforce our previous
conclusions concerning the impact of comparable worth on female employees.
However, in terms of the initial size of sex discrimination, these results
imply that it was quite small. This is more consistent with our results in
the Human Capital model section than with the results in the Comparable Worth
and Human Capital-Job Attributes model sections. It is likely that the
difference can be traced to the fact that we omitted the percent female job
variable in predicting the pay ratios of this section.
One additional set of results are reported in Table 10. These pay
difference regressions are reported separately by sex using the Human Capital
model control variables (excluding the female dummy variable). Table 10
provides a way of determining -whether the individual e:q)lanatory variables had
uniform impacts on men and women in connection with the comparable worth
plans.
Comparable worth increased the importance of credentials as determinants
of pay, and this effect is stronger for women than for men in the case of
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licenses. Likewise women were the major winners (except in some cases for
Arthur Young plans) to the extent that supervisors, professionals, union
covered, and union dues payers made gains. Males in professional associations
were more likely to gain than women, except in connection with the appeals
recommendations under which both sexes made major advances.
Comparable worth reduced the importance of market wages and, as one would
expect, this was most true for women. Taking ten years of experience as the
norm, the reduction in weight on job tenure and e3q)erience was stronger for
women than men. On the other hand, there is no clear difference between the
sexes for the education variable. Finally, although the magnitudes remain
small, there is some evidence that minority women lost pay whereas minority
men were not affected. Likewise single women lost pay while single men gained
pay or broke even. This is interesting in that this variable was generally
insignificant in the earlier pay differences regressions which were not
disaggregated by sex.
VI. Conclusions
Our results strongly support our e3q)ectations concerning comparable
worth. Although the 1985 political compromise moderated the size of the pay
increases and eliminated any pay cuts, both of the original Arthur Young
plans, the actual 1985 implemented plan, and the Appeals process increased the
pay of women relative to men. This was accomplished by raising pay in the
predominately female jobs. Although the Arthur Young plan would have
eliminated virtually all of the "underpaj^ent gap*', the compromise plan and
the Appeals recommendation only eliminated a portion of the gap.
The estimated pay ratios suggest that although women may have been
underpaid relative to men to 1983', the magnitude of the gap was not large.
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Our Human Capital model suggests that women were underpaid by at most
5 percent and the implimentation of comparable worth by the State may have
eliminated 35-41 percent of this gap by 1987. There apparently was not a
major discrimination problem initially. It is an interesting question whether
the development of the comparable worth process and its impact would be
different had greater pay discrepancies existed.
Although the majority of state employees gained from the additional funds
allocated in 1985 to implement comparable worth, certain groups gained more.
Most notably, our uncontrolled tabulations suggest that low wage earners and
those with the least education and e:q>erience gained the most. These occurred
in the health, clerical, and social service departments of state government
where wages are low and women tend to predominate. This suggests that low
wage women tended to gain more than high wage women. On the other hand,
female minorities may have lost slightly relative to higher paid whites,
although it should be stressed that Iowa has very few minority employees.
Most of these conclusions are reinforced in the controlled regression models.
A few higher paid employees tended to gain relative to others. In
particular, supervisors (especially female supervisors) gained relative to
lion-supervisors. In addition, those employees having credentials such as a
license, vocational training, or a Ph.D. came out ahead. This suggests that
comparable worth evaluators tend to stress credentials and deemphasize years
of education and experience.
It is less clear whether union members gained relative to nonunion
employees. Our basic human capital model suggests that they did gain, largely
as a result of the State/AFSCME contract negotiations and compromise. This
conclusion is also supported by the modified human capital model in, which the
market wage is eliminated. Although the addition of the job factors to the
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hiunan capital variables reverses, the sign on the union impact, we tend to
I
discount the importance of this result. In our view, union gains came through
the job factors so that it is inappropriate to control for these job factors
i
if one wants to measure the total impact of the union. In total, unionized
workers gained relative to non-union workers. Similar conunents apply to
groups such as supervisors and professionals.
Both comparable worth plans tended to reduce the role played by market
wages in the State pay plan. This is particularly true for women. However,
neither plan was so radical as to totally eliminate a role for market wages as
measured in our regressions. Even after controlling for job factors and for
the percent female, we find that market wages and human capital variables
still explain a significant proportion of the post-comparable worth variations
in pay rates.
As we emphasized above, no State employee lost pay in absolute terms in
the short run as a result of comparable worth, even though some employees lost
in relative terms. In the long run, however, the losses in relative pay may
eventually become absolute losses. The reason is that the costs of
implementing the comparable worth plan were substantial, particularly in the
face of significant budget problems at the State level in Iowa, This would
imply that future overall pay growth in the Iowa State Merit System may be
constrained due to the added costs of the comparable worth adjustments. If
indeed pay growth in the Iowa public sector slows relative to pay growth in
the private sector, the real earnings for those suffering relative reductions
in earnings may eventually fall.
There are some notable differences between the two Arthur Young plans.
In general, the Statistical plan provided better fits for the data perhaps
because it wasn't based on subjective factor weights. The Statistical plan
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also would have provided larger gains for women and for female jobs than the
Committee plan. This is somewhat surprising in that the Committee plan tended
to deemphasize the market wage, education, and experience more than the
statistical plan. While the statistical plan aided women the most, it tended
to be less favorable to supervisors and to unions. Indeed, unions lost
relative pay under the Statistical plan. These results suggest that
comparable worth is not a homogeneous process with a single outcome. The
actual impact can vary with the mode of analysis.
Our results suggest that the appeals process tended to continue the
pattern of changes which had occurred in 1985. There was no
"counter-movement" by males and others seeking to reverse the previous |
changes. Rather, what we observe is a continuation of the pattern of relative
gains for women and unions (especially association dues members).
As a final point, we can only speculate as to whether the conclusions
obtained in the Iowa case would generalize to other states or localities.
There are several reasons why the Iowa case would seem to be tj^ical of
con^arable worth plans in general. First, the methodology used by the Arthur
Young consultants was quite standard in the area of job analysis, and in fact,
Arthur Young has been quite active in performing these analyses in other
states. Second, AFSCME is the largest public sector union and has been quite
active in the comparable worth debate in other states. It seems likely that
the type of compromise struck in Iowa preventing pay cuts resulting from
comparable worth would not be an isolated occurrence. On the other hand, it
is clear that the comparable worth-process in Iowa was heavily influenced by
economic and political factors and the subjectivity of committee assigned
factor weights. We have no basis for judging whether this experience is
common to other settings. However, we would not be surprised to discover that
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economics, politics, and the values of those involved in the evaluation
process would be very important in shaping the outcomes of pay analyses done
elsewhere.
For example, governmental budget constraints would tend to cause pressure
toward moderation on the parties. We would anticipate that the issue of pay
cuts and reallocation of resources would arise, leading to opposition
(especially from unions representing males, who might lose). This implies
that in order to build support for a comparable worth plan, the scope of the
plan (in terms of dollars, number and type of jobs analyzed, potential size of
pay increases or decreases) may need to be limited ^ ante. Clearly, such
compromises need not take the exact form as in Iowa, but the potential for
pressure to compromise at some stage in the comparable worth process would
exist in all states.
A5
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TABLE 1 Mean and Standard Deviations
Mean Standard Deviation
All Female Male All Female Male
1983 Pay $636.14 $560.39 $711.65 $204. 81 $153 .13 $221.32
Arthur Young Statistical Fay $648.05 $606.51 $689.45 $195. 52 $153 .38 $217.13
Arthur Young Committee Pay $671.71 $625.10 $718.18 $173. 97 $129 .07 $198.80
1985 Pay $675.88 $612.71 $738.84 $197. 45 $155 .82 $213.84
Appeals Proposal Fay $686.78 $628.00 $745.36 $197. 34 $160 .12 $212.94
1987 Appeals Fay $692.04 $629.38 $754.50 $199. 26 $161 .12 $213.56
[AY Statistical Pay-1983 Fay] $11.90 $46.12 -$22.20 $65. 18 $49 .67 $60.79
[AY Committee Pay-1983 Pay] $35.57 $64.71 $6.53 $74. 66 $64 .67 $72.61
[1985 Pay-1983 Pay] $39.74 $52.32 $27.19 $46. 96 $52 .10 $37.19
[Appeals Pay-1983 Pay] $50.63 $67.61 $33.71 $53. 27 $50 .59 $50.43
[1987 Pay-1983 Pay] $55.90 $68.99 $42.85 $47. 53 $48 .93 $42.25
Education 13,27 13.02 13.51 2. 377 2 .031 2.656
MS .0533 .0376 .0690 . 2258 .1902 .2556
Ph.D .0121 .0032 .0209 , 1091 .0567 .1429
License .0653 .0815 .0492 . 2472 .2737 .2163
Vocational .1957 .2698 .1219 4996 .5839 .3843
Military .2180 .0161 .4193 • 4149 .1259 .4968
Tenure 8.337 6.950 9.720 7. 804 6 .492 8.707
Experience 8.492 6.482 10.495 9. 019 6 .891 10.348
Years Out 1.147 2.004 .293 3. 273 4 .364 .9748
Supervisor .1320 .0928 .1711 • 3386 .2902 .3767
Professional .2051 .1583 .2519 4039 .3651 .4342
Full-time .9769 .9679 .9858 1149 .1344 .0905
Market Wage $7,887 $6,608 $9,162 $2. 820 $2 .190 $2,801
Union .7740 .7822 .7658 • 4183 .4129 .4236
Dues .1524 .1218 .1829 • 3594 .3271 .3867
Association dues .0335 .0333 .0337 1799 .1794 .1805
Single .3385 .4131 .2642 4733 .4925 .4410
Minority .0206 .0231 .0182 1421 .1502 .1336
Female .4992 1.000 .0000 5001 .0000 .0000
% Female Job .4992 .7868 .2125 3781 .2309 .2602
Arthur Young Total Points 268.4 247.8 289.0 79. 50 68 .50 87.92
N 3734 ' 1864 1870
TABLE 2 Average Annual Pay Change Relative to 1983 Pay
Arthur
Young
Statistical
Arthur
Young
Committee
1985
Compromise
Appeals
Proposal
1987
Appeals
%
Female
Females $1199 $1682 $1360 $1758 $1794 100.0%
Males -577 170 707 876 1113 0.0
100% Female Job $1712 $1822 $1491 $1723 $1794 98.4%
81-99% Female Job 1810 2047 1382 1898 1901 95.3
41-80% Fomnle Job 552 1444 1397 1762 1813 61.8
1-40% Female Job -849 -244 380 543 714 15.1
0% Female Job -982 -145 723 714 1173 0.0
Whites $311 $925 $1037 $1319 $1458 49.8%
Minorities 241 922 846 1201 1230 55.8
< 12 Yrs School -$341 $1653 $1328 $1538 $1741 35.7%
12 Yrs School 457 1403 1181 1384 1529 57.0
13-15 Yrs School 477 833 1022 1303 1373 53.6
16 Yrs School 155 -170 694 1156 1276 41.2
> 16 Yrs School 80 -164 611 1073 1249 33.9
< 2 Yrs Experience $531 $999 $1126 $1484 $1599 58.2
2-5 Yrs Experience 356 1064 1092 1385 1502 55.4
6-10 Yrs E3q)erience 261 817 967 1276 1397 50.8
11-20 Yrs Experience 194 958 1015 1244 1398 46.3
21-30 Yrs Experience -43 653 883 1054 1244 29.3
> 30 Yrs Experience -122 645 775 771 1064 11.7
< 2 Yrs Tenure $247 $1331 $1160 $1376 $1467 54.6%
2-5 Yrs Tenure 363 973 1039 1264 1409 54.9
6-10 Yrs Tenure 529 982 1036 1436 1560 56.5
11-20 Yrs Tenure 260 563 • 896 1237 1409 42.6
21-30 Yrs Tenure -81 395 955 1154 1380 25.3
> 30 Yrs Tenure -134 97 714 1083 1168 23.4
Part-time $834 $1894 $1197 $1328 $1350 70.7%
Full-time 285 880 1026 1316 1458 49.0
TABLE 2 Average Annual Pay Change Relative to 1983 Pay (Continued)
Arthur
Young
Statistical
Arthur
Young
Committee
1985
Compromise
Appeals
Proposal
1987
Appeals
%
Female
Health/Medical $1242 $2462 $2838 $3464 $3482 80.,8%
Social Work 721 1966 1857 2583 2612 69.J
Clerical 2148 2146 1128 1280 1286 96,1
Liquor Stores 431 1541 1129 996 1139 40.,4
Education 757 459 894 1371 1371 67.,1
Parks, Agric. 20 685 832 1877 1643 11.,0
Crafts -885 709 739 827 1398 4.,7
Service 262 1694 671 1199 1218 67,,4
Law Enforcement -2316 -423 351 426 448 10.,1
Emplojmient 337 -253 328 418 418 43.,2
Regulation -1185 -612 318 89 400 16.,4
Transportation -618 -1115 241 178 573 12,,3
Tax/Finance 38 -1226 225 322 472 36.,6
Confutation 108 -2398 160 -635 189 34.,4
< $5 Market wage $463 $2911 $2109 $2295 $2303 68.,5%
$5-8 Market wage 754 1244 933 1279 1319 68,,3
$8-11 Market wage -51 337 865 1347 1538 26..8
$11-14 Market wage -232 -1078 541 380 784 25. 7
> $14 Market wage -1491 105 438 -40 634 14..9
Supervisors $350 $387 $1323 $1533 $1667 26.,0%
Non-supervisors 303 1007 989 1284 1420 52. 2
Professionals $206 $91 $1193 $1459 $1603 38.,5%
Non-professionals 336 1140 992 1280 1414 52.,9
Union contract $218 $1020 $1012 $1327 $1469 50. 4%
No contract 624 598 1107 1282 1399 48. 1
Dues paying -$424 $1268 $1175 $1338 $1522 39. 9%
Association dues 435 809 1082 2428 2230 49. 6
No dues 441 865 1005 1267 1382 51. 8
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Table 6 Total Factor Point Regressions
Adding Adding
% Female Job L (Market Wage)
Intercept 56.4 71.5 -A.46
(6.23)* (8.07)* (.47)
Education 10.7 10.8 8.87
(24.6)* (25.6)* (21.0)*
MS 3.13 2.72 4.54
(.79) (.71) (1.23)
Ph.D 89.8 83.4 73.0
(12.0)* (11.5)* (10.4)*
License 33,9 36.4 29.0
(9.70)* (10.7)* (8.80)*
Vocational 10.6 12.2 8.90
(6.46)* (7.66)* (5.75)*
Military 5.03 3.06 3.87
(2.12)* (1.33) (1.75)
Tenure 2.18 1.93 1.26
(7.66)* (6.98)* (4.68)*
Tenure^ -.034 -.032 -.020
(3.48)* (3.38)* (2.23)*
Experience -.169 -.082 -.368
(.68) (.34) (1.57)
Experience^ -.007 -.005 .004
(.99) (.76) (.59)
Years Out -.604 -.527 -.371
(2.44)* (2.20)* (1.61)
Supervisor 38.3 35.7 40.4
(9.24)* (8.86)* (10^4)*
Professional 78.4 74.5 61.8
(23.0)* (22.4)* (18!8)*
Full-Time 31.4 31.9 14.6
(A.52)* (4.73) (2!22)*
Market Wage ^
(17^5)*
Union 9.43 6.07
7.18
(3.38)* (2.23)* (2.74)*
Table 6 Total Factor Point Regressions (Continued)
Adding
% Female Job
Adding
L (Market Wage)
Dues 3.97 1.70 5.98
C1.78) (.79) (2.85)*
Assoc. Dues 21.2 20.2 14.9
(4.9A)* (4.84)* (3.70)*
Single -2.52 -1.75 -1.75
(1.51) (1.08) (1.12)
Minority -1.63 -3.02 -1.37
(.30) (.58) (.27)
Female -19.4 4.30 3.43
(10.4)* (1.78) (1.48)
% Female Job -46.02 -17.6
(14.8)* (5.16)*
.661 .680 .704
F 361.4* 374.8* 401.0*
^Significant at .05 level.
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TABLE 8 Ratio of Female to Male Earnings
Arthur Arthur
Young Young 1985 Appeals 1987
1983 Statistical Connnittee Compromise Proposal Appeal
Uncorrected
W-p
wi .787 .880 ,870 .829 .843 .83A
n
Corrected for Human Capital Model (Table 3)
.951 1,009 .996 ,96A .977 .9712.
%
W3' ^ .983 1.075 .993 .982 .995 .989
Corrected for Comparable Worth Model (Table 4)
Excluding % Female Job
W
^ .877 .986 .957 .913 .929 .916
Wp
w5- 5^ .895 .989 .959 .926 .939 .931
, Corrected for Human Capital-Job Attributes Model (Table 5)
Excluding % Female Job
6. ^
%
7.
.918 1.001 1.007 .955 .982
^ .965 .985 .993 .986 .984
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